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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The use of the Internet will spread widely in coming years and commerce on the World Wide Web 
will boom.1 We expect to be able to buy products easily from home over the Internet and have access to 
all kinds of information sources. The well-known concern is that browsing the Internet will create 
detailed databases describing each user’s browsing patterns and that third parties will then be able to 
assemble comprehensive profiles about online users. The information about the user is gathered 
through the collection of transactional data, Internet tracking, and tracking IP addresses.2 Companies 
and third parties collect a variety of personal information including name, e-mail, address, telephone 
number, credit card number, Social Security number, age or date of birth, gender, education, 
occupation, income, hobbies, interests, and the type of hardware or software used by the online 
consumer.3 The information is then stored in customer lists, databases for marketing programs, cookies, 
bugs, etc., therefore breaching the privacy of the online users.  
 
2. Privacy has been defined as the “The right to be left alone”4 and interpreted by the German Court in 
1983 as “Information self-determination.”5 In a more modern society, privacy is more likely to be defined 
as “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII) which is information that can be linked to a specific 
individual like a name, an address, data elements such as date of birth and zip code, or a transactional 
history and that can narrow the focus down to a small group of defined people. Privacy is about user 
control over their personal information, over collection and use of personal data, about disclosure of 
information to third parties and about the possibility of having a proper recourse in the case of breaches.  
 
3. Privacy on the Internet has arisen as one of the leading consumer concerns. In given studies, it 
appeared that 85% of online users regard the privacy of information transmitted online as the most 
important issue on the Internet6 and 87% of Internet users are concerned with threats to their individual 
privacy while online.7  
 
4. These Internet users are not wrong in their concerns if we consider recent privacy abuses. Toys R 
Us used a third party web log analysis service without disclosing this fact and was served with a class 
action suit for breaching its privacy policy.8 Toysmart, who had initially promised not to sell data to third 
parties, decided to sell data anyhow as it went bankrupt, so the Federal Trade Commission had to 
intervene and stop the transaction.9 Finally, the Double Click scandal occurred when it was revealed 
that after the online company’s database was merged with the Abacus Direct database marketer, the 
company intended to sell the 100,000 online user profiles it had compiled without the users’ 
knowledge.10  
 
5. In order to solve privacy problems and make sure companies are obligated to comply with privacy 
laws or more specifically with the standards established by the European Commission, many companies 
similar to Zero-knowledge Systems Inc.11 and Anonymizer.com12 are or have been marketing privacy-
enhancing technologies in order to protect and assure the privacy of the individual in the digital world.  
 
6. The Freedom software version 2.013 created by Zero-knowledge and the Anonymizer14 software 
created by Anonymizer.com, like most of these online privacy-enhanced technologies, use a method 
called encryption, which scrambles the data, making it illegible to everyone except the intended 
recipient. The goal has been to create mathematically rigorous systems that will prevent even the most 
determined attackers from discovering the user’s identity, therefore significantly reducing the risk of data 
theft or accidental leaks of sensitive information from the Internet user’s computer.15  
 
7. While these privacy tools do help to protect the privacy of the Internet users in making sure that 
data collectors comply with the European Privacy Directives,16 a further analysis may determine that 
these software programs are illegal according to Canadian, American or French encryption control laws 
and regulations. 
 
1. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)  
 
8. In order to minimize the collection of Internet users’ personal data and help solve the problem of 
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online privacy, companies like Zero-knowledge and Anonymizer.com have developed the following 
online privacy tools: 
 
1.1 Zero-knowledge Freedom 2.0 software  
 
9. Zero-knowledge, with offices both in Montreal and San Jose, California has emerged as one of the 
market leaders in privacy-enhancing technology. Zero-knowledge was founded in 1997 by Hammie, 
Austin, and Hamnett Hill in Montreal, Quebec. Their mission has been to develop and market 
technologies that will protect the privacy of the individual in the digital world. 
 
10.  They launched their consumer product “Freedom” in December 1999 and declared that it was the 
only comprehensive consumer privacy product to protect individuals on the Internet. Freedom 2.0 was 
eventually released and was offering, until recently, the additional option to add enhanced premium 
services, such as untraceable encrypted e-mail, anonymous Web browsing and anonymous chat.  
 
11.  While Zero-knowledge has stopped providing anonymous Web browsing and encrypted pseudonym 
e-mail services since October 2001.17 its then-available version 2.0 of the Freedom software was 
providing a complete security tool for Internet users that had features and technical descriptions that 
may be similar to other Internet privacy-enhancing technologies, including Anonymizer18 (that will be 
further analyzed in this paper), net HUSH,19 Idzap,20 Ponoi,21 PrivacyX,22 Private Idaho,23 Rewebber,24 
and Siege Surfer.25 
 
1.1.1 Features of the Freedom 2.0 software 
 
12.  The Personal Firewall function protected the user’s computer against malicious intruders. A firewall 
is a combination of hardware and/or software that separates a Local Area Network, which is a computer 
network limited to the immediate area, into two or more parts for security purposes. 
 
13.  The Form Filler function speeded up and secured online registrations and transactions. It 
automatically filled out forms, making online registrations and purchases quick. It also remembered login 
passwords to save the user time.  
 
14.  Every browser26 is assigned an ID number. That ID number is held in a file called a cookie. That 
number is not attached to a name, just a number. Thousands of sites use cookies to enhance the user’s 
Web viewing experience. Cookies cannot damage user files, nor can they read information from a user’s 
hard drive. Cookies allow sites and advertisers to "remember" users across pages of a site and across 
multiple visits to a site. This feature facilitates e-commerce and Internet advertising in numerous ways, 
including: allowing personalization features such as stock portfolio tracking and targeted news stories, 
allowing shopping cart capabilities and quick navigation across multiple zones of e-commerce sites, 
remembering user names and passwords for future visits, and delivering advertisements targeted to a 
user’s interests.27  
 
15.  The Cookie Manager function prevented web sites from tracking the user’s activities and enabled 
the users to control the cookies they receive. It automatically erased the user’s tracks by deleting 
cookies third parties could employ to assemble comprehensive dossiers of their customer profiles and 
spending patterns. 
 
16.  The Ad Manager function controlled ads and speeded up browsing, eliminated distractions and 
prevented activity-tracking cookies and "Web bugs" from being dropped onto the user’s computer. This 
could be used to control ad frequency or the number of times a user sees a given ad (spam28 control). 
 
17.  The Keyword Alert prevented personal information from leaving the user’s computer. It instantly 
scanned all outgoing communications for sensitive information and warned the user before sending 
anything that contains it. For example, the user could program Freedom to scan for his real name or 
telephone number and Freedom would alert the user before releasing it.  
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18.  For users demanding the highest level of online security and privacy protection, Freedom offered 
additional premium services to ensure the most secure and private Internet experience available. 
 
19.  The Untraceable Encrypted E-mail function secured and privatized the user’s e-mail, an essential 
feature for those needing to send important and sensitive information with absolute security. Freedom’s 
"military-grade" encrypted e-mail system worked with the user’s existing e-mail account to ensure that 
no one, including the user’s ISP, could intercept and read the user’s messages. Freedom also blocked 
unsolicited bulk e-mail (spam) from reaching the user’s inbox.  
 
20.  Finally, the Anonymous Browsing and Chat function provided the user with a tool to go online 
undetected. This function erased the tracks the user leaves when he browses the Web and posts to 
newsgroups or chat rooms. 
 
1.1.2 Description of the Freedom 2.0 software 
 
21.  The Freedom 2.0 Internet Privacy Suite was made up of the following three components: Network + 
Nym + Strong Encryption = Internet Privacy.29 
 
22.  The Freedom Network created private routes between the user’s computer and the destination 
computer. Freedom was automatically re-routing data through a series of globally distributed servers 
known as the Freedom Network. This private network was acting as a cloak to provide the Internet user 
with anonymous connections to the Internet. Freedom servers had no way of matching the original 
source with the ultimate destination of the user’s mail or Web connections. Freedom worked 
transparently alongside the user’s existing browser and did not require the user to change ISPs.  
 
23.  Pseudonymisation is the process of changing personal data by using an attribution algorithm in 
such a way that it is impossible to link individual details of a personal or commercial nature to an 
individual without knowing or being able to use that algorithm.30 Freedom 2.0 was letting the online user 
create multiple online identities by means of pseudonymous nicknames called nyms. The user could 
employ nyms to interact on the Internet but the nyms could never be traced back to the user. 
 
24.  Switching from one nym to another was quick and easy and allowed the user to separate private 
interests from its true identity. When using Freedom’s premium services, all mail and Web 
communications were encrypted and sent through the Freedom Network. No one, including the user’s 
ISP, could associate the user’s nyms with the user’s true identity.  
 
25.  According to Zero-knowledge, marketing companies were unable to compile an accurate profile of 
the user’s online browsing habits. Also, malicious hackers were unable to intercept, read and link the 
user’s e-mail messages to his true identity and no one was able to monitor the user’s sensitive personal 
information.  
 
26.  Finally, Freedom 2.0 used “Strong encryption” of 128-bits on all incoming and outgoing Internet 
traffic.31  
 
1.2 Anonymizer.com software 
 
27.  Anonymizer.com is a San Diego-based company founded in 1996 and is a pioneer of Internet 
privacy technologies. It is one of the most popular and trusted names in online privacy services. Its 
mission is to ensure that going online does not compromise an individual’s right to privacy.  
 
28. Anonymizer acts as a shield between the Internet user and all of the most prevalent online privacy 
and security threats. 
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1.2.1 Features of the Anonymizer software 
 
29.  The Anonymous Web Surfing service rewrites the web pages the Internet user wants to view on 
his protected servers and removes privacy and security threats from web pages before serving them to 
the user. It also hides the Internet user’s unique IP address from web sites and other outside parties, 
preventing them from seeing the user’s browsing. 
 
30.  The service blocks cookies and prevents outside parties from putting malicious files or code on the 
user’s hard drive.  
 
31.  The Safe Cookies function makes it safe to accept cookies from sites that require them, for 
example for shopping, sign-ups, personalized content, etc., without worrying about long-term tracking. 
Anonymizer converts long-term cookies sent to the Internet user by Web sites into session-only, 
automatically expiring cookies. These cookies are encrypted by the Anonymizer to ensure 
intermediaries cannot read them and are rewritten so as to be session-only, so that they are not stored 
permanently on the Internet user’s computer.  
 
32.  The URL Encryption function scrambles the Internet user’s Web page requests so that third parties 
(including the user’s boss, ISP or co-workers with access to the user’s Internet connection) are not able 
to log them.  
 
33.  The Ad Filtering function removes standard-size banner ads from the user’s page views for faster 
and more secure surfing. 
 
34.  The Anonymizer Secure Tunneling Service, on top of the above-mentioned features, provides 
Anonymous Newsgroup access and the Anonymous E-mail function to enable online users to send 
anonymous e-mails. 
 
35. It is interesting to note that Freedom 2.0 provided similar features to Anonymizer, and a 
comparative analysis of these software is available on Anonymizer.com’s website.32 
 
1.2.2 Description of the Anonymizer software 
 
36.  The Anonymizer surfing provides a secure encrypted connection to the Anonymizer’s servers and 
enables the Internet user to surf anonymously with the Cookie Encryption feature (that lets the Internet 
user safely access and use Web sites that require cookies) and the URL Encryption feature (that 
encrypts the Internet user’s page requests so that their ISP are not able to log them). The service also 
blocks cookies, Java, JavaScript, and other tracking methods and provides Anonymous Instant 
Messaging and Anonymous Newsgroups. URL encryption is achieved through the use of 128-bits 
encryption.33 
 
37.  When a user connects normally to the Internet, his transactions are relayed through several servers 
before reaching their final destination. These servers have the ability to collect information as the user’s 
requests are routed through them.34 Since the user’s requests are not encrypted, any server between 
the user and his final destination could see what the user is doing. The Secure Tunneling service--that 
can be used independently of, or transparently in conjunction with Anonymizer Surfing--creates a 
virtually impregnable tunnel from the online user’s computer to Anonymizer’s servers, and encrypts the 
Internet activity between the Internet user’s computer and the Anonymizer’s servers. This prevents any 
servers between the user and Anonymizer, such as the user’s ISP, from monitoring the user’s activities. 
 
38.  Anonymizer Secure Tunneling account function allows the user to encrypt his incoming and 
outgoing e-mail, surf and news posts through a method known as “port forwarding”. Secure Shell 
(“SSH”) is a program that encrypts everything about the message and sends it to the Anonymizer 
servers. Since SSH does port forwarding, a third party monitoring the Internet user’s connection will not 
be able to tell that what the user has sent was mail. When the message is received by the Anonymizer’s 
servers, the message is decrypted and sent "as normal" to the recipient. Anonymizer uses the most 
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popular encryption algorithms of 128-bits to provide Internet users with this function.35 
 
39.  Finally, the Anonymizer Dialup Access service provides the features of Anonymous Web Surfing 
and Anonymizer Secure Tunneling but also lets Anonymizer become the Internet user’s ISP connection.  
 
1.3 Encryption  
 
40.  Traditionally, cryptography was almost exclusively reserved for the domain of governments. 
Cryptography protected military or diplomatic secrets and was predominantly embedded in hardware. 
 
41.  As previously mentioned, Freedom 2.0 used “Strong encryption” of 128-bits on all incoming and 
outgoing Internet traffic36 and Anonymizer uses the exact same strength of encryption to provide 
Internet users with the URL encryption feature37 and to encrypt Internet traffic.38  
 
42.  Encryption scrambles the user’s data, making it illegible to everyone except the user’s intended 
recipient. Cryptographic methods provide encryption, decryption, and digital signatures. Encryption 
provides for confidentiality: keeping information protected from unauthorized disclosure or viewing by 
mathematically scrambling the original text. Digital signatures, which are analogous to written signatures 
in that they are an electronic identifier created by a computer and attached to an electronic document, 
provide other functions like authentication (proof that users are who they claim to be), non-repudiation 
(proof that a transaction occurred or that a message was sent or received), and integrity (so that data 
cannot be modified without detection).  
 
43.  There are two major cryptographic methods. In Secret Key cryptography, the same key is used to 
encrypt and decrypt the data. This type of cryptography requires both parties to pre-arrange the sharing 
of the single key that is used for both encryption and decryption. 
 
44.  In Public Key cryptography, there are two different but related keys and what is encrypted with one 
can only be decrypted by the other. Each user has a private key and a public key. The private key is 
kept secure, known only to the user, the other key can be made public and either sent over the network 
to each correspondent or placed in a secure public directory. To use this kind of system, the sender 
would encrypt a message with the recipient’s public key, and only the recipient’s private key could 
decrypt the message. Public key cryptography thus permits the secure transmission of data across open 
networks such as the Internet without the necessity of previously exchanging a secret key. This allows 
parties who do not know each other to exchange and authenticate information and conduct business in 
a secure manner and this represents the method used by Freedom 2.039 and Anonymizer.40 
 
45.  Without access to the correct key, data encrypted to ensure confidentiality can only be decrypted 
into understandable data by trying all possible variations of the key and checking to see if the result is 
meaningful. All other things being equal, cryptographic strength is defined by the length of the 
cryptographic key (or bit-length) and determines the number of possible permutations. With each bit 
added to the length of the key, the strength is doubled. It is estimated that it would take well over 13 
billion times the age of the universe to crack a 128-bit key like the one used by Zero-knowledge or 
Anonymizer.com in their software.41 
 
2. Privacy  
 
46.  Internet Service Providers and managers of Local Area Networks can, using reasonable means, 
identify Internet users to whom they have attributed IP addresses as they normally systematically “log” 
in a file the date, time, duration and IP address given to the Internet user. The same can be said about 
the Internet Service Providers that keep a logbook on the http server. In these cases there is no doubt 
about the fact that one can talk about “personal data” in the sense of article 2 a) of the Directive 
95/46/EC.42 In other cases, a third party can get to know the IP address of a user but not be able to link 
it to the other data concerning this person that would make their identification possible.  
 
47.  The likelihood exists in many cases, however, of linking the user’s IP address to other personal 
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data, whether such data is publicly available or not, that will identify the user, especially if use is made of 
invisible processing means to collect additional data on the user. For instance, the data collector could 
be using cookies containing a unique identifier or a modern data mining system linked to large 
databases containing personally identifiable data on Internet users. 
 
48.  Therefore, even if it may not be possible to identify a user in all cases and by all Internet actors from 
the data processed on the Internet, the possibility of identifying large masses of personal data of the 
Internet user exists in many cases .  
 
2.1 European Directives  
 
49.  The general data protection Directive 95/46/EC applies to any processing of personal data43 falling 
within its scope, irrespective of the technical means used. Personal data processing on the Internet, 
therefore, has to be considered in light of this Directive.44 
 
50.  The specific Directive 97/66/EC on the protection of privacy and personal data in the 
telecommunications sector particularizes and complements the general Directive 95/46/EC by 
establishing specific technical and legal provisions. Directive 97/66/EC applies to the processing of 
personal data in connection with the provision of publicly available telecommunications services. The 
Internet thus forms part of the public telecommunications sector.45 Directive 95/46/EC applies to all 
matters that are not specifically covered by Directive 97/66/EC.46  
 
2.1.1 Data Quality 
 
51.  The EC data protection Directive 95/46/EC contains two principles which have direct consequences 
for the design and use of new technologies: its “finality” or “purpose” principle requires that personal 
data only be used where necessary for a specific legitimate purpose.47 
 
52.  The Directive states that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully,48 collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes.49 The data must be adequate, relevant, not excessive in relation to the purposes for which 
they are collected and/or further processed,50 accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete (keeping in mind 
the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed) are erased or 
rectified.51  
 
53.  A user shall be entitled, free of charge, to be omitted from a printed or electronic directory at the 
user’s request and to indicate that the user’s personal data may not be used for the purpose of direct 
marketing.52 
 
54.  The “finality” or “purpose” principle mentioned above is the underlying motive for the concept of 
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies.53 This concept refers to a variety of technologies, like the Freedom or 
the Anonymizer software, that safeguard personal privacy, notably by minimizing or eliminating the 
collection or further processing of identifiable data.54  
 
55.  As a matter of fact, each of Freedom 2.0 and Anonymizer aims to hinder any unlawful forms of 
processing by, for instance, making it technically impossible for unauthorized persons to access 
personal data, so as to prevent the possible destruction, alteration or disclosure of these data.  
 
56.  Freedom 2.0 is based on the use of a so-called identity protector that may be regarded as an 
element of the system that controls the release of an individual’s true identity to various processes 
within the information system. Its effect is to cordon off certain areas of the system that do not require 
access to true identity. Several other techniques are used by the software to introduce an identity 
protector into an information system including, among others, encryption techniques involving digital 
signatures. Anonymizer hides the Internet user’s unique IP address from web sites and other outside 
parties, preventing them from seeing the user and preventing outside parties from putting malicious files 
© copyright 2001 Lex Electronica <http://www.lex-electronica.org>  
Tous droits réservés / All Rights Reserved    7 
or code on the user’s hard drive.  
 
2.1.2 Consent and Data Access 
 
57.  According to the European Directives, personal data may be processed only if the data subject has 
unambiguously given his/her consent.55  Also, the data collector must provide a data subject from whom 
data relating to himself are collected with the purpose of the intended processing56 (except where the 
subject already has it) and any further information, such as the existence of the right of access and the 
right to rectify data concerning the subject.57  
 
58.  Also, the data subject has to have the right to object, on request and free of charge, to the 
processing of personal data relating to him/her which the controller anticipates being processed for the 
purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data are disclosed for the first time to 
third parties or used on his/her behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered 
the right to object free of charge to such disclosures or uses.58 
 
59.  Each of Freedom 2.0 and Anonymizer safeguards personal privacy, notably by minimizing or 
eliminating the collection or further processing of identifiable data59 therefore making these concepts 
irrelevant since no personal data will be collected at any time (at least no relevant data that could be 
useful to a third party like a marketing company).  
 
2.1.3 Data Security and Confidentiality 
 
60.  When it comes to the issues of confidentiality and security, data controllers must take appropriate 
measures to protect the information supplied by their customers against unauthorized access or 
disclosure, in particular when the process involves the transmission of data on a network, as is the case 
with electronic transactions on the Internet. These measures must take into account the risks to security 
and confidentiality, the nature of the data, and state-of-the-art technology.60 
 
61.  Everyone has the right to send mail to others without that mail being read by a third party. Article 5 
of Directive 97/66/EC lays down obligations as to the confidentiality of communications. In addition to 
these obligations, Article 4 of the same Directive obliges the providers of telecommunications services 
to take appropriate technical and organizational measures to safeguard the security of their services 
and to inform users about a particular risk of a breach of security and any possible remedies, including 
the costs involved. 
 
62.  In the off-line world, everyone has the ability to send a letter anonymously or under a pseudonym. In 
order to be able to send anonymous e-mail, the user could obtain an anonymous e-mail address from 
several providers of such a service. Freedom lets the online user create multiple online identities using 
pseudonymous nicknames called nyms so that the user may use nyms to interact on the Internet but the 
nyms can never be traced back to the user. Anonymizer hides the Internet user’s unique IP address 
from web sites and other outside parties, preventing them from knowing the user’s identity and also 
enables the users to surf anonymously, send anonymous e-mails and have anonymous Newsgroups 
access. It also provides the Cookie Encryption feature that lets the Internet user safely access and use 
Web sites that require cookies.  
 
63.  From the user’s point of view, a number of issues are relevant depending on the type of e-mail: 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication. Confidentiality is the protection of the transmitted data to 
prevent eavesdropping and one possible way to guarantee confidentiality is encryption of the message 
to be sent. Integrity, which is a guarantee that information is not altered accidentally or on purpose, can 
be obtained by calculating a special code on the basis of the text and transmitting this special code 
which is then encrypted along with the text itself. Authentication, which guarantees that a user is who 
he/she claims to be, can be verified by exchanging digital signatures based on digital certificates. These 
certificates do not need to mention the real name of the user and instead can mention pseudonyms, as 
stipulated in Article 8 of the Electronic Signature Directive.61 
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64.  For security and confidentiality purposes, each of the Freedom 2.0 and the Anonymizer software 
uses full-strength encryption on Internet traffic62 or on the connection to the Anonymizer’s servers to 
enable the Internet user to surf anonymously63 while offering a feature that blocks unwanted cookies. 
This significantly reduces the risk of data theft or accidental leaks of sensitive information from the 
user’s computer and in some cases provides proof that users are who they claim to be, as well as non-
repudiation (proof that a transaction occurred or that a message was sent or received), and integrity, so 
that data cannot be modified without detection.  
 
2.2 Privacy-Enhancing Technology Companies 
 
65.  It may be obvious that Privacy-Enhancing Technologies developed by companies like Zero-
knowledge or Anonymizer.com are useful in the protection of the privacy of online users. At the same 
time it is still to be determined if these companies are promoting privacy through their business model, 
when they have or may have access to personal information related to their customers. 
 
2.2.1 Zero-knowledge 
 
66.  Zero-knowledge’s vision on privacy is the following: 
 
“Everyone has the right to control their personal information. Only you 
should have the right to decide what people know about you. Freedom 
gives you total control over your private and sensitive information on the 
Internet, allowing you to decide who gets to know what about you.”64 
 
67.  According to Zero-knowledge, two different parties have audited Freedom in order to make sure that 
Zero-knowledge is not gathering data about their users. It has also released its entire source code to the 
Freedom client base and has begun to release the source code to the Freedom Network. Its system is 
designed so that no one, including Zero-knowledge, knows the true identity behind a Freedom user’s 
online pseudonymous identity (nym). This is made possible by its activation code purchasing system, 
which separates personally identifying information from nyms, making any sort of association between 
the two impossible. The only information that can apparently be recovered by Zero-knowledge is the 
information related to when the nym was created or renewed, the number of messages sent by the nym, 
the e-mail address, and date of sent messages. 
 
2.2.2 Anonymizer.com 
 
68.  Anonymizer.com’s vision of privacy is based on Article 19 of this fifty-year-old document that the 
Internet has made more applicable than ever:  
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”65 
 
69.  On its website, more specifically under the section entitled “Account Policies”, Anonymizer.com 
states that it considers the Internet user’s e-mail address to be confidential information and that it will 
never rent, sell or otherwise reveal it to others without the user’s prior consent.66 It further mentions that, 
while it does hold the necessary billing information on certain users (those, for example, who pay by 
credit card), this information could in no way be correlated with the user’s Internet activities, since its 
billing system and the Anonymizer.com services run totally independently of each other. It also 
advertises that anonymous cash payment is available to purchase its services and products.67 
 
70.  Anonymizer.com further states that it maintains no information that would identify which user had 
sent a given message or visited a given site and that it does not store phone numbers, addresses or 
other information that would help identify users.68 
© copyright 2001 Lex Electronica <http://www.lex-electronica.org>  
Tous droits réservés / All Rights Reserved    9 
 
3. Encryption 
 
71.  Cryptography is the transformation of data by a mathematical formula called a key, rendering data 
unintelligible for anyone without the right key. Cryptographic technologies provide a foundation for 
establishing trust in electronic commerce or web browsing because they safeguard information, protect 
communications, and authenticate parties to transactions. 
 
72.  Encryption has implications both for electronic methods of doing business, public safety, and 
national security and it can protect sensitive or personal information, support electronic commerce, 
prevent theft of sensitive data, and protect intellectual property. 
 
73.  But the very elements that make cryptography attractive for reasons of privacy, competition, human 
rights, and business security can also conceal activities which pose a threat to public safety since it is 
equally true that cryptographic technologies could be used to hide criminal activity and to threaten 
national security. Criminals and terrorists could use cryptography to thwart the legally-mandated 
information-gathering abilities of law enforcement and security agencies. The inability to access or to 
decrypt information could well have a significant impact on the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of crime.  
 
74.  For this reason each country has laws and regulations related to cryptographic products, whether it 
is according to its import or export control regulations, or according to the regulations regarding the 
domestic use of such products.  
 
75.  Privacy-Enhancing Technologies like Freedom 2.0 or Anonymizer are available through Zero-
knowledge’s Canadian and Anonymizer.com’s United States web sites for downloads and purchases by 
anyone having access to the Internet. A European customer looking to purchase such privacy tools from 
North American web sites may be found in breach of the French laws, given that France may have more 
restrictive encryption control policies. For this reason, it may be interesting to compare Canadian 
standards with the American or the European standards regarding encryption control. 
 
3.1 Canada  
 
76.  Until recently, customized encryption software or hardware products with a key length of 40 bits or 
less were exportable even if banking and financial institutions were permitted to export 56-bit DES69 
products. On December 24, 1996, Canada modified its policy for a twelve-month trial period to allow 
export of 56-bit customized encryption software or hardware with embedded encryption to most 
countries. This was then extended for another six months70 until the new Canadian policy was put in 
force in order to respond to the changes in the global supply of, and demand for, cryptography products. 
 
77.  Canada was previously a member of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls71  
(COCOM), an international organization for the mutual control of the export of strategic products and 
technical data from country members72 to proscribed destinations. It maintained, among others, the 
International Industrial List and the International Munitions List. In 1991, COCOM decided to allow 
export of mass-market cryptographic software, including public domain software. 
 
78.  The main goal of the COCOM regulations was to prevent cryptography from being exported to 
countries considered "dangerous", usually the countries thought to maintain friendly ties with terrorist 
organizations, such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Exporting to other countries was usually 
allowed, although states often required a license to be granted. 
 
79.  COCOM was dissolved in March 1994. Pending the signing of a new treaty,73 most members of 
COCOM agreed in principle to maintain the status quo and cryptography remained on export control 
lists. 
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3.1.1 Export/ import controls 
 
80.  Canada does not currently restrict or control the import, production or use of any strength of 
cryptographic products within Canada.  
 
81.  Canada, previously a member of COCOM, now has export commitments pursuant to the 
Wassenaar Arrangement74 on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a thirty-three-nation75 international protocol established 
in 1996 which restricts the export of hardware, some software cryptography products, and products that 
use cryptography. It was created on the basis of the Initial Elements to contribute to regional and 
international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of 
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. 
Participating states seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not 
contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals and 
are not diverted to support such capabilities.  
 
82.  Consequently, in February 1998, a discussion White Paper by the Task Force on Electronic 
Commerce76 entitled “A Cryptography Policy Framework for Electronic Commerce”77 was released for 
discussion. The White Paper stressed the importance of accessible cryptography as a building block for 
electronic commerce.78 Immediately following this publication, the government announced a new 
cryptography policy on October 1, 1998, and Industry Minister John Manley affirmed the government’s 
commitment to the Wassenaar Arrangement by announcing the elements of Canada’s Cryptography 
Policy.79 The Policy is a component of the Canadian Electronic Commerce Strategy and it permits 
Canadians to develop, import and use whatever cryptography products they wish and does not impose 
mandatory key recovery requirements or a licensing regime. The policy encourages the growth of 
electronic commerce, allows Canadian producers to export their products globally within the framework 
of international arrangements, and contains measures to maintain the capability of law enforcement 
agencies to ensure public safety. 
 
83.  The official federal policy on cryptography80 announced in October of 199881 outlined the six 
following elements:82 
 
84.  Canadians should be free to develop, import and use whatever cryptography products they wish; 
 
85.  The government will not impose mandatory key recovery requirements or licensing regimes for 
certification authorities or trustees; 
 
86.  The government will encourage industry-based use and modeling of responsible cryptography 
practices and will act as model user, through its current public key infrastructure (PKI) initiative;83 
 
87.  Export controls will comply with the Wassenaar Arrangement, the goal being to maintain a level 
playing field for Canadian cryptography manufacturers against those of other countries; 
 
88.  The government intends to streamline the export permit process and make it more transparent; and 
 
89.  Legislative amendments will be introduced to protect consumer privacy while providing a legal 
framework for law enforcement and national security agencies. More specifically, the government 
proposes amendments to the Criminal Code and other statutes as necessary to criminalize the wrongful 
disclosure of keys, deter the use of encryption in the commission of a crime, deter the use of 
cryptography to conceal evidence and apply existing interception, search and seizure and assistance 
procedures to cryptographic situations and circumstances.   
 
90.  Moreover, warrants and assistance orders also apply to situations where encryption is encountered 
to obtain the decrypted material or decryption keys.84 
 
91.  These guidelines for the export of information and security-related equipment and technologies that 
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are reflected in hardware and software dual-use lists are found in the Export Control List85 and, more 
specifically, in Group 1 of the Control List. These export controls are authorized by the Export and 
Import Permits Act. According to the Commerce/NSA report, the Export and Import Permits Act86 
(EIPA), the Export Control List87 (ECL) and the Area Control List (ACL) are the mechanisms by which 
Canada controls exports. The EIPA authorizes the government to exercise export controls to ensure 
that military or strategic goods are not exported to destinations representing a strategic threat to 
Canada. The Ministry of External Affairs is responsible for the implementation of the Act. 
 
92.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs,88 pursuant to subsection 7 (1.1) of the Export and Import Permits 
Act, has issued the annexed General Export Permit No. 39 that covers the “Mass market cryptographic 
software” on June 1, 1999. This Permit defines the term “Mass market cryptographic software” as: 
 
“Mass market cryptographic software means the goods referred to in 
Group 1 of the schedule to the Export Control List that are described in 
item 115489 of the Guide and that meet all of the following conditions: 
 
- generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, 
from  
- stock at retail selling points by any of the following means: (i) over-
the-counter transactions, (ii) mail order transactions, (iii) electronic 
transactions, or (iv) telephone transactions; 
- the cryptographic functionality cannot easily be changed by the user; 
- designed for installation by the user without further substantial 
support by the supplier; and 
- does not contain a symmetric algorithm employing a key length 
exceeding 128 bits.” 
 
93.  Any resident of Canada may, under the authority of and in accordance with this Permit, export mass 
market cryptographic software from Canada90 even though the Permit does not authorize the 
exportation of mass market cryptographic software to any country listed in the Area Control List or any 
of the following countries:91 North Korea, Iran and Iraq.92 Additionally, the countries of Angola, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Myanmar have been  included on the Canadian Area Control List 
since 1999.93 For this reason it is presently illegal to download cryptographic software from one or all of 
these countries or redistribute cryptographic software to these countries. 
 
3.1.2 Domestic laws and regulations 
 
94.  There are no domestic regulations on cryptography so Canadian individuals and firms are free to 
use and trade any strength of encryption throughout Canada.94 
 
3.2 United States of America  
 
95.  The United States government has long been the leader in limiting the development and 
dissemination of encryption. For the past twenty years, this country has attempted to suppress 
development of encryption through manipulating standards, recommending legislation, and imposing 
export controls. In the past several years, as electronic commerce has become an important aspect of 
the American economy, the U.S. government has begun backing away from these efforts, which have 
not been successful and had generated considerable controversy and opposition. Finally, in January 
2000, the Administration announced a new export policy that relaxed many controls. 
 
3.2.1 Export/ import controls  
 
96.  There are no import restrictions on cryptography in the United States. On the exporting side, the 
U.S. has signed the Wassenaar Arrangement but has not implemented the pre-December 1998 General 
Software Note and generally maintains stricter controls. 
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97.  Export controls on commercial encryption products are administered by the Bureau of Export 
Administration (BXA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. Rules governing exports of encryption are 
found in the Export Administration Regulations.95  
 
98.  Cryptography export used to be controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).96 
At the end of 1996, cryptography export was transferred to the Export Administration Regulations of the 
Department of Commerce where the export policy was relaxed to favor export of data-recovery 
cryptography97 and encryption rules are now published by BXA since that transfer.98 The Department of 
Justice is now included in crypto export decisions.99 Making cryptography available on the Internet is 
considered export, unless appropriate measures are taken to prevent foreigners from accessing the 
cryptography. 
 
99.  As previously mentioned, the U.S. government, after many years of delay, has begun to relax export 
controls of encryption products. In January 2000 the government announced changes to the Export 
Administration Regulations concerning the export of cryptographic products100 after evaluating many 
different requirements for cryptographic exports.101 The earlier announcement permitted cryptographic 
exports to certain business sectors in certain countries and eliminated the requirement for key recovery 
mechanisms to be included in exports.  
 
100.  The new regulations were published on January 12, 2000,102 but on October 19, 2000, the 
Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) published a rule implementing the Administration’s 
announcement on July 17, 2000,103 therefore amending the January 2000 regulations.  
 
101.  The new regulations of January 2000 and October 2000 largely eliminated the sector and country 
limitations and also brought some changes to the prior regulations. Now any encryption commodity or 
software, including components, of any key length can be exported under a license exception after a 
technical review by the BXA to any non-government end-user in any country except for the seven state 
supporters of terrorism.104 Exports previously allowed only for a company’s internal use can now be 
used for any activity, including communication with other firms, supply chains and customers. Previous 
liberalizations for banks, financial institutions and other approved sectors are continued and subsumed 
under the license exception.105  
 
102.  Any encryption item, including commodities, software and technology, of any key length may be 
exported to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms without a technical review.106 All items produced with 
encryption commodities, software, and technology authorized under this license exception will require a 
technical review only for items to be re-exported, resold or transferred.107 
 
103.  Exports to government end-users may be approved under a license unless the destination is a 
foreign government member of the European Union or one of eight selected countries.108 This last 
license exception was included during the first policy update in 2000, since the Administration was 
committed to ensure that U.S. exporters would not be disadvantaged by steps taken by the European 
Union (EU) in the creation of a "free-trade zone". As a matter of fact, the October rule’s major change 
tracks with the recent regulations adopted by the EU by permitting most encryption products to be 
exported to the fifteen EU member states and eight additional trading partners under a license 
exception.109 
 
104.  Also, the October rule allows the release of consumer products incorporating short-range 
technologies, streamlines reporting requirements, liberalizes the export of commercial source code, 
clarifies the treatment of object code compiled from source code considered publicly available, and 
allows procedures for the release of certain products from U.S. Content Requirements. U.S. exporters 
can ship products immediately after filing a commodity classification request without waiting for the 
technical-review results or the previously used thirty-day delay period.110 
 
105.  The policy111 was adopted in response to the changing global market, advances in technology 
and the need to give the U.S. industry better access to these markets, while continuing to provide 
essential protections for national security.  
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3.2.2 Domestic laws and regulations 
 
106.  There are no domestic use controls on cryptography in the United States so American individuals 
and firms are free to use and trade any strength of encryption throughout the United States. 
 
3.3 France  
 
107.  France has a long history of regulating the use of cryptography. Prior to 1990, France considered 
cryptographic products “war materials” and generally prohibited their use with some exception. Before 
1996, delivery, importation, exportation, and use of cryptography were subjected to (a) prior declaration, 
if the cryptography could have no other objective than authenticating communications or assuring the 
integrity of transmitted messages and (b) prior authorization by the Prime Minister in all other cases.  
 
108.  Simplified procedures existed for certain cryptography products or services or certain user 
categories. For authorization, a file containing technical details and administrative data had to be 
submitted and such authorization could be subjected to certain conditions in order to reserve the use of 
certain types of cryptography to defined user or application categories.  
 
109.  On June 18, 1996, the French legislature passed a new law on cryptography, “Loi de 
réglementation des télécommunications”112 which amended the 1990 law.113 Decrees on the application 
of the law were published on February 25, 1998,114 and several more decrees were also published on 
March 13 and 23,  1998.115 The law slightly liberalized the use of authentication-only encryption but also 
introduced the requirement for Trusted Third Party (TTP) systems. A TTP is an independent third party 
who is trusted by both the user and the service provider, similar to a digital attorney.116 This party can be 
trusted with keeping such things as the master key linking digital pseudonyms with the true identities of 
their users. The trusted party knows that the relationship between a user’s true identity and his pseudo-
identity must be kept completely secret. However, if certain conditions require it, the trusted party will be 
permitted to reveal the user’s identities to a service provider or to law enforcement authorities. The only 
authorized Trusted Third Party or Key Escrow Agency (KEA) was SCSSI,117 according to a decree on 
March 13, 1998.118  
 
110.  In that decree it was proposed that cryptography that did not provide confidentiality could be used 
without restriction, so the prior requirement of declaration would be cancelled while the supply of 
authentication-only cryptography still had to be declared. However, both use and supply of 
confidentiality cryptography still required authorization. Decree 98-206119 specified categories of 
cryptography, which did not require a declaration or an authorization.120 A supplier would be exempted 
from the formalities for use exclusively for developing, validating, or demonstrating cryptography if he 
informed SCSSI at least two weeks in advance. A supply authorization for collective use exempted 
users from acquiring use authorization. The use of cryptography with key lengths limited to 40 bits would 
be exempted from declaration according to decree 98-207.121 
 
111.  However, the law was never enacted and the new Socialist government of Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin seemed to change course on France’s strict policies on cryptography usage.  
 
3.3.1 Export/ import controls  
 
112.  France signed the Wassenaar Arrangement for export controls in December of 1998, with the 
exception of the pre-December 1998 General Software Note, so it controls the export as well as the 
import and use of encryption products. French encryption controls are administered by the Service 
Central de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (SCSSI), an office reporting to the Prime Minister 
through the Secrétariat Général à la Défense Nationale (SGDN). This reflects a general French view 
that technology and industrial policy are critical elements of national defense.122 
 
113.  At a press conference on January 19, 1999, Prime Minister Jospin announced the liberalization of 
the domestic crypto legislation.123 In March 1999 the French government released the relevant decrees 
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to implement relax controls on encryption. The decrees allow for the use of encryption up to 128 bits, 
raised from 40 bits, as well as relax requirements that keys be placed with “Trusted Third Parties”. 
These changes were implemented in Decrees 99-200124 and 99-199,125 pending the implementation of 
the law which is to offer full liberalization of crypto use. 
 
114.  The import from countries outside the EU and the EEA (European Economic Area) and export of 
cryptography is regulated according to the law of 26 July 1996126 and the decrees implementing it of 24 
February 1998,127 and of 17 March 1999.128  
 
115.  Decree 99-200 of March 17, 1999, that replaced the decrees 98-206 and 98-207 of March 23, 
1998, specifies categories of cryptography that do not require any prior formality. Decree 99-199 of  
March 17, 1999 specifies categories of cryptography for which prior declaration is required, instead of 
prior authorization.  
 
116.  For cryptographic products with key length up to 40 bits, there is no formality for importation.129 
For products between 40 to 128 bits, there is no formality for importation except in the event that such 
importation is for a physical person who will use the product for confidentiality purposes.130 In the event 
that it is not the case, a declaration will be required by the user wishing to import the said product.131 
 
117.  Also, for cryptographic products with key length up to 128 bits, the user needs an authorization 
prior to exporting the said product.132 
 
118.  Export of dual-use goods, including cryptography, is regulated by the Council Regulation (EC) No 
1334/2000133 setting up a community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology 
and replacing the earlier 1994 Council Regulation.134  
 
119.  Export to other EU countries and within the EU is entirely liberalized, with the exception of some 
highly specialized products, such as cryptanalysis items. For these items, member states can issue 
General Intra-Community Licenses valid for export to one or more determined EU countries provided 
basic requirements are met, such as a statement of the end use of exported items. For re-exports after 
intra-EU export, an information-exchange mechanism is established.  
 
120.  For export to Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Switzerland and the United States, a Community General Export Authorization (CGEA) can be 
applied for, which is valid for export from all EU countries.  
 
3.3.2 Domestic laws and regulations 
 
121.  France has restricted the domestic use and supply of cryptography for a long time. Restrictive 
legislation where authorization and declaration were required for almost all cryptography was slightly 
liberalized in 1996 and the domestic use of cryptography was further liberalized in January 1999. As a 
matter of fact, there is no formality to personally use a cryptographic product that is between 40 to 128 
bits in France, except if the end user is a physical person who will personally use the product.135 If this is 
not the case and the product will be used simply for confidentiality purposes, a declaration is required.136  
 
122.  The Association des Utilisateurs d’UNIX et de Systèmes Ouverts137 surveyed over 200 French 
companies and released a white paper in January 2000.138 A majority of the companies felt that they 
were still placed at a competitive disadvantage because of the French law. Only five percent of the 
respondents provided their keys to a “Trusted Third Party.” The groups called for the full relaxation of 
controls on encryption and the development of encryption standards to facilitate electronic commerce. 
For this reason, a law on “Information Society” is currently being drafted that would fully relax encryption 
controls which is expected to be approved this year. 
 
4. The legality of online Privacy-Enhancing Technologies  
 
123.  The “finality” or “purpose” principle established by the European Directives139 is the underlying 
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motive for the concept of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies140 like the Freedom and the Anonymizer 
software, that safeguard personal privacy, notably by minimizing or eliminating the collection or further 
processing of identifiable data.141 These privacy tools aim to hinder any unlawful forms of processing by 
making it technically impossible for unauthorized persons to access personal data, so as to prevent the 
possible destruction, alteration or disclosure of these data.  
 
124.  This makes most of the principles and standards established by the European Directives 
irrelevant since no personal data will be collected at any time, at least no relevant data that could be 
useful to a third party.  
 
125.  Freedom 2.0 lets the online user create multiple online identities using pseudonymous nicknames 
called nyms. The user can then use nyms to interact on the Internet without the nyms being traced back 
to the user, taking into account the principles of confidentiality of communications established by the 
Directives.142 Anonymizer also protects the confidentiality of its customers by scrambling the Internet 
user’s Web page requests so that no third parties with access to the user’s Internet connection are able 
to log them. It further promotes confidentiality with its Anonymous Email and Anonymous Newsgroup 
access features. 
 
126.  Finally, each of Freedom 2.0 and Anonymizer uses full-strength encryption on Internet traffic143 
and/or on the Internet user’s connection to the Anonymizer’s servers144 and provides a feature that 
blocks unwanted cookies therefore significantly reducing the risk of data theft or accidental leaks of 
sensitive information from the user’s computer, which is in line with the principle of data security 
established by the European Directive.145 
 
127.  While each of the Freedom and the Anonymizer software can be quite useful to protect the 
privacy of the Internet users, anonymity on the Internet can be viewed as threatening. In a recent Study 
on Legal Aspects of Computer-Related Crime in the Information Society,146 it was outlined that technical 
solutions and measures against the abuse of anonymity on the Internet should be taken.  Another 
perceived threat can be seen where non-repudiation services based on certified pseudonyms and the 
certification authority is able and obliged to furnish the name and address of the holder of the 
pseudonym under clearly defined circumstances. 
 
128.  For this reason, Zero-knowledge requires that the use of the Freedom software comply with all 
applicable laws and regulations, including all applicable local, provincial, state, national, and 
international laws and regulations and including all laws relating to copyright, trademark, obscenity, 
defamation, the right of privacy, false advertising, threats of violence and incitation of hate and fraud.147 
Anonymizer.com requires that its software shall not be used for sending commercial e-mail solicitation, 
harm computer systems, threaten someone, send mass e-mailings, obtain unauthorized access to any 
computer system, furtherance of criminal activity and other illegal activities.148 
 
129.  In a general way, the Freedom 2.0 and the Anonymizer software are legal if the user or customer 
is careful to obey the intellectual property and export rules, as well as any local rules that may apply in 
the nation they are in. A legal disclaimer on the Freedom website states the following: 
 
“Zero-knowledge Systems makes no representation that materials on the 
Freedom Site are appropriate or available for use in other locations, and 
accessing them from locations where their contents are illegal is 
prohibited. Those who choose to access the Freedom Site from other 
locations (than Canada) do so on their own initiative and are responsible 
for compliance with local laws .”149 
 
130.  As for Anonymizer, although the site does specify under the user agreement section that the 
customer certifies that they are not under-age,150 they do not specify that those who choose to access 
their site or purchase their products and services, from other locations than the United States, do so on 
their own initiative and are responsible for compliance with local laws. It is interesting to note that after 
contacting the Anonymizer website IRC chat support services to determine if their products were legal in 
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foreign countries,151 the author did not receive a clear answer and was referred to the 
www.fsecure.com.152 
 
131.  While Freedom and Anonymizer do help in protecting the privacy of Internet users, it is to be 
determined if these privacy tools are legal according to laws regulating cryptographic products in 
Canada, in the United States and in France.  
 
4.1 Canada 
 
132.  Canada does not currently restrict or control the import, production or use of any strength of 
cryptographic products within Canada so for this reason it is generally legal to import the Anonymizer 
software.  
 
133.  It is also legal to export the Freedom software from Canada, without a license, to non-government 
end-users. However, there are restrictions with regards to Angola, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and Myanmar that are listed in the Area Control List as well as  North Korea, Iran and Iraq.153   
 
134.  To that effect, the Freedom software website states the following: 
 
“Legal contract: 
Canadian law prohibits us from allowing the download of cryptographic 
software from countries on Canada’s Area Control List. I am not 
downloading this software from a country on Canada’s Area Control List. I 
will not redistribute this software to a country on the Area Control List. I 
understand that downloading or distributing this software to a country on 
the Area Control List is a violation of Canadian law.”154 
 
135.  For this reason, it is presently illegal to download Freedom 2.0 from one or all of these countries 
or redistribute the software to these countries.  
 
136.  There are no domestic regulations on cryptography. Also, there are no laws restricting the private 
use of cryptography so Canadian individuals and firms are free to use and trade the Freedom or the 
Anonymizer software throughout Canada. 
 
4.2 United States of America 
 
137.  There are no import restrictions on cryptography in the United States so it is legal to import the 
Freedom software to the United States from any country or to purchase the Anonymizer software from 
such country. 
 
138.  Since the new regulations of 2000, a Privacy-Enhancing Technology such as the Anonymizer 
software can now be exported from the United States under a license exception after a technical review 
by the BXA to any non-government end-user in any country except for the seven state supporters of 
terrorism.155 Exports of the Anonymizer software from the United States to government end-users may 
be approved under a license unless the destination is a foreign government member of the European 
Union or one of the eight selected countries.156  
 
139.  On this issue, while Anonymizer.com mentions in the user agreement found on its website that 
such agreement is governed by and will be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
California, United States of America,157 it does not specify, as previously mentioned, that the United 
States prohibits certain countries from downloading the software and that those who choose to access 
the Anonymizer.com site from other locations than the United States do so on their own initiative. 
 
140.  Anonymizer can be exported or re-exported to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms without a 
technical review.158 Finally, there are no domestic use controls on cryptography in the United States so 
anyone is free to use Freedom or Anonymizer within the country. 
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4.3 France 
 
141.  France used to be quite restrictive, but now the nation allows its citizens to use strong 
cryptography, recognizing its value in preventing some crimes and strengthening electronic commerce. 
 
142.  There is no formality to import the Freedom or the Anonymizer software in France only in the 
event that such importation is for a physical person that will use the product for confidentiality 
purposes.159 In the event that it is not the case, a declaration will be required by the user wishing to 
import the said software.160 
 
143.  As for exporting from France software that would have a similar technical description to the 
Freedom or Anonymizer software, the user will need an authorization prior to exporting such 
software.161 Exporting software similar to Freedom 2.0 or Anonymizer within the EU is liberalized162 and 
for export to Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Switzerland and the United States, a Community General Export Authorization (CGEA) can be 
requested, which is valid for export from all EU countries.  
 
144.  The domestic use of cryptography was recently liberalized and there is no formality to personally 
use the Freedom or Anonimyzer software, only if the end user is a physical person who will have a 
personal use of the product.163 If this is not the case and the Freedom or the Anonymizer software will 
be simply used for confidentiality purposes, a declaration is required.164  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
145.  An analysis of the export and import controls in Canada, in the United States and in France as 
well as an analysis of the regulations regarding the domestic use of cryptographic products in these 
countries established that--in a general way and only recently--Freedom 2.0 and Anonymizer are legal 
except in limited cases. Even if we consider that the strength of encryption used in these tools would 
make them legal in a country like Canada, the actual “use” of the software could be illegal. As a matter 
of fact, the software could be used to infringe copyright and trademark laws, to promote obscenity and 
defamation, to abuse the right of a third party’s privacy, to promote false advertising or hate and fraud, 
therefore making the use of the software illegal.  
 
146.  Zero-knowledge was promoting the fact that its Freedom 2.0 software would give the online users 
total control over the disclosure of their private and sensitive information since it would let the users 
manage their privacy and choose whether they wish to reveal their identity or remain private, depending 
on the situation. It also invoked the fact that the users could, while using its software, express 
themselves online and visit their favorite web sites without worrying about who was tracking or profiling 
their online activities and they could also block malicious hackers from accessing their computer system 
and decide who could send them e-mail, virtually eliminating abuse and online spam.  
 
147.  Online Privacy-Enhancing Technologies suggest that cryptography should be deployed widely to 
assure security in the transmission of data in order, for example, to prevent a malicious party from 
obtaining credit card numbers or any other personal information online.  
 
148.  Cryptography is important to the growth of electronic commerce because it allows users to 
authenticate and safeguard sensitive data such as credit card numbers, electronically signed 
documents, personal e-mail and other information stored in computers or transmitted over closed or 
public networks such as the Internet. Cryptography can also be used in a wide range of applications, 
from the government communicating securely with citizens to the ensured confidentiality of medical 
records in hospital databases. 
 
149.  On the one hand, encryption is crucial for information security and for protecting privacy, but on 
the other hand, full anonymity may be undesirable in particular circumstances, such as those associated 
with criminal activity where legitimate reasons exist to identify the individual. Governments are trying 
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hard to address these conflicts of interest, but up to now their proposals for regulation have been 
controversial. The policy debate is polarized, with privacy activists and law-enforcement agencies 
fiercely opposing each other’s point of view. 
 
150.  Ian Goldberg, Chief Scientist at Zero-knowledge, suggests that instead of putting their faith in 
privacy laws, online users should use privacy-enhancing technologies in order to protect their privacy 
online. He recently stated: “The law of the land can be changed by the next administration. The laws of 
mathematics are more rigid.” 
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